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Body Modification Practices and the Medical Monopoly  
Joseph Tarquin Foulkes Roberts 
(Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice)  
Abstract 
The state currently grants the medical profession a monopolistic entitlement on the legal use 
of medical technology. As physicians are duty bound to not expose people to medically un-
necessary harm, individuals who wish to engage in Body Modification Practices are effec-
tively precluded from doing so as only physicians are legally entitled to use medical technol-
ogy. In this paper I argue this is incompatible with respect for persons. Abolishing the med-
ical monopoly allows us to meet the demands of respect for persons by granting access to 
technology, whilst still upholding physicians’ right to refuse to provide requested services and 
thereby determine the boundaries of their profession according to what they consider to be 
the internal morality of medicine.  
Keywords: Body Modification Practices, Respect for Persons, Medical Monopoly, Conscien-
tious Refusal, Controversial Medical Services  
I. Introduction  
In this paper I argue in favour of liberalising access to medical technology so as to 
enable those individuals who wish to pursue Body Modification Practices (BMPs) to do so. 
Under current UK statutory Law, the defence of consent does not apply to the pursuit of 
BMPs, although it does apply to conventional surgery.  This, I argue, is a consequence of the i
medical monopoly (i.e. the the web of legal entitlements that grant exclusive licences to use 
medical technology to physicians). This state backed control by physicians over appropriate 
uses of bio-medical technology precludes those who wish to pursue BMPs from living their 
lives in accordance with their own values. 
Drawing on an account of respect as non-interference I argue that although physicians 
are entitled to refuse to perform BMPs if they consider they fall outside the realm of medi-
cine (for example by being incompatible with the physician’s professional duty to benefit 
people in health-related ways or to promote their ‘best interests’), the profession should not 
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be granted a monopoly on the use of medical technology. Individuals who wish to engage in 
BMPs as a form of self-expression, resistance to dominant social codes or as an aesthetic pur-
suit should be entitled to do so irrespective of whether these activities expose them to health 
risks for no countervailing health benefit.  
The argument of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II I provide a definition of 
Body Modification Practices and argue that the fact physicians are under a professional duty 
to provide health-benefits precludes them from participating in the pursuit of many BMPs. 
Section III grounds the claim that physician’s currently have monopolistic entitlements to use 
medical technology. Section IV briefly presents an account of respect for persons which, in 
section V, is used to argue that physician refusal to participate, when coupled with monopo-
listic control over medical technology, is incompatible with respecting people. This, I argue 
in section VI, gives us reason to liberalise access to medical technology by abolishing the 
medical monoply. In section VII I argue that although extending access to medical technolo-
gy to non-medics may raise safety concerns, these do not constitute a reason to uphold the 
medical monopoly; before turning, in Section VIII, to dismissing the claim that we have a 
duty to uphold our health strong enough to ground prohibiting access to medical technology. 
Finally, section IX considers and rejects the possibility that using the person’s ‘best interests’ 
to determine physicians’ professional obligations could solve the problem of lack of access to 
medical technology created by the existence of the medical monopoly. 
II. Body Modification Practices and Physician Refusal 
Body modification is a term which has been used to denote a somewhat heteroge-
neous group of practices such as: tattooing, scarification, piercing, branding, cosmetic 
surgery, body building, hair styling, body painting and make-up, the insertion of implants and 
hardware under the skin, tanning, skin whitening, the use of prosthetics, voluntary amputa-
tions, gender reassignment surgery, circumcision, sub incision of the penis, neck and skull 
elongation, stretching of various body parts, the sharpening of teeth, and the sustained use of 
corsetry or other constricting devices.  ii
What, if anything, unifies these practices? Firstly the practices all involve the non-
trivial alteration of the physical size, shape, appearance and/or functionality of the body even 
if they do so with varying degrees of permanence and using different methods. The second 
unifying feature of this group of practices is the way in which the body is modified. Body 
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Modification Practices (BMPs) involve deliberate and purposeful alterations of the flesh, as 
opposed to mere passive acceptance of bodily changes. Defining BMPs as purposeful and 
deliberate allows us to distinguish between progressively losing one’s pigmentation as a con-
sequence of working night shifts, which would not be a form of BMP, from engaging in skin 
whitening, which would be.  
The pursuit of BMPs has often been pathologised in the psychological and psychiatric 
literature. In particular, the pursuit of BMPs is often taken to be a reason to question the qual-
ity of the person’s agency and the voluntariness of the decision.  The suggestion is that, aliii -
though individuals claim they want to engage in BMPs, the desire to engage in these prac-
tices is likely to be the kind of desire that people aren’t autonomous with respect to. If the 
pursuit of BMPs is generally non-autonomous, the objection proceeds, the fact people are 
precluded from engaging in them is not a cause for concern.  
This attempt to downplay the importance of BMPs in virtue of them being non-
autonomous, however, ought to be resisted. As Thomas Schramme argues, we have little 
reason to believe that all instances of BMPs are pathological as there are plenty of cases 
which it would be a stretch to consider involuntary or the product of a form of disordered 
agency.  Individuals who engage in BMPs report doing so in order to achieve a myriad of iv
goals. Some people engage in BMPs as a means of creating personal narratives, pursuing 
beauty or expressing themselves as individuals; others as a way of connecting with spiritual 
and cultural traditions, expressing group affiliations or as a means of resisting dominant so-
cial trends. Still others modify their body to test their physical endurance and explore their 
sexuality.  v
Those who engage in BMPs seem to take their activities seriously and engage in them 
as a way of achieving a variety of goals. Although it is possible that some individuals engage 
in BMPs non-autonomously, this is not always the case. If say, someone engaging in BMPs 
couldn’t endorse their desire, reflect on their motivations or control their impulses; they may 
be non-autonomous. Whether or not a particular individual is non-autonomous with respect to 
their BMPs, hence, will depend on the particulars of the case. The important point is that es-
tablishing that the pursuit of BMPs is non-autonomous cannot be done in general terms. Ab-
sent strong empirical evidence that demonstrates participants have faulty understandings of 
their own motivations and behaviour, are non-autonomous with respect to their desires, or 
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have diminished agency; we ought to take participants reports of their own activities serious-
ly.  
Individuals who wish to pursue BMPs will find it hard to find a sympathetic physi-
cian. The reason physicians are likely to refuse to participate in BMPs is that their pursuit is 
often incompatible with the goals of medicine. Physicians have a professional duty to provide 
health-benefits,  an important corollary of which is the duty to not expose people to medicalvi -
ly-unnecessary harm.  Edmund Pellegrino, for example, argues that clinical medicine cenvii -
tres around a healing relationship between the person afflicted by an ailment and the individ-
ual who professes to heal.  As the medic offers themselves as a healer of a vulnerable ill viii
person, physicians are duty bound to further the health of the people they care for. Leon Kass 
also takes the view that medicine is, first and foremost, about health and that uses of medical 
skill and knowhow in the pursuit of other projects is incompatible with the internal morality 
of medicine.   ix
Although BMPs are pursued for a number of reasons, they are not normally pursued 
as a means of restoring or maintaining the person’s health. Moreover, the pursuit of BMPs 
often involves exposing oneself to health risks (e.x. tissue damage, infection…) for no coun-
tervailing health benefit. This distinguishes BMPs from conventional surgery, which exposes 
individuals to similar risks in order to reverse, avert, control or mitigate other more serious 
medical harms. The lack of a countervailing health benefit makes physician involvement in 
BMPs problematic in a way that their involvement with conventional surgery is not. As 
physicians have a duty to refuse to provide services which are incompatible with the goals of 
medicine, a category into which many BMPs fall, people who wish to engage in BMPs will 
find it difficult to find a sympathetic physician to perform these procedures and, if they do, it 
is likely that their attempts will be thwarted by the profession as a whole.  
 There are some notable exceptions to medicine’s focus on health. Cosmetic surgeons 
perform a number of non-health based BMPs like rhinoplasties, breast implants and liposuc-
tions with the goal of enhancing people’s beauty (or at least helping them look like they want 
to look). As cosmetic surgery has been allowed to flourish, this could be seen as an indication 
that medicine as a whole isn’t committed to the goal of health. 
 This, however, is not the case. The existence of non-health based BMPs within the 
boundaries of the profession is an inconsistency in current practice, one that clashes with the 
general obligation of physicians to promote people’s health. The use of medical technology 
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by doctors to enhance people’s beauty has been continually subject to dispute in the medical 
profession at large.  Cosmetic medicine as a field has struggled to gain recognition since the x
facial reconstruction techniques developed following WWI were applied to alter the faces of 
individuals who had not suffered battle wounds. Whilst restoring normal functionality to 
wounded soldiers was the proper domain of medicine, the beautification of individuals 
without severe facial deformities was considered an illegitimate use of medical technology. 
 Non-health based BMPs are marginal practices within the wider profession even 
when they are  practiced. The marginal status of cosmetic surgery has led to a proliferation of 
attempts to justify it as a means of promoting people’s ‘best interests’ or a more holistic no-
tion of health. For example, it is often claimed that rhinoplasties and breast enlargements can 
be justified in virtue of their psychological benefits, such as increased self-confidence and 
decreased anxiety.  On this interpretation of cosmetic surgery, the aesthetic goal is merely a xi
means to the goal of alleviating psychological burdens. This way of viewing cosmetic surgery 
is an attempt to legitimise the practice in the eyes of the wider medical community by linking 
it to the wider goals of the profession (which include promoting and maintaining people’s 
mental health).  
  These justifications for cosmetic surgery imply a wider view of the boundaries of the 
profession which does not fit well with how we ordinarily understand medical practice. I will 
return to the question of whether we ought to reinterpret the role of medicine and adopt a best 
interest standard in section IX. There I will argue that adopting a best interest standard only 
serves to perpetuate the problem posed by the medical monopoly: the fact professions have 
undue influence over what people are allowed to do with their bodies. For now it is important 
to note that, although cosmetic surgeons perform some non-health based BMPs (such as rhi-
noplasty), there are other forms of BMP they do not provide (such as scarification or brand-
ing). As a consequence, some people will be precluded from pursuing their plans.  
 To summarise, Body Modification Practices (BMPs) are practices in which one pur-
posefully and non-trivially alters the shape, size, appearance and/or functionality of the body. 
As engaging in some forms of BMPs exposes individuals to health-risks, physicians are 
likely to object to providing some of these procedures. In the next section I ground the claim 
that the medical profession has monopolistic legal entitlements to use medical technology. In 
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sections IV and V I show how the existence of the medical monopoly, when coupled with 
physician refusal to participate in BMPs, is incompatible with respect for persons. This, I ar-
gue in section VI, gives us reason to abolish the medical monopoly.  
III. The Medical Monopoly  
By medical monopoly I mean the web of legal entitlements that grant exclusive li-
cences to use medical technology to physicians. The state grants physician’s monopolistic 
control over the uses of medical technology in a number of ways.  Firstly, the medical proxii -
fession has a monopoly over technology like surgery in virtue of the fact possessing a med-
ical licence is necessary to perform it legally. Without a licence to practice, any form of cut-
ting another person opens the ‘cutter’ up to charges of wounding, Actual Bodily Harm and 
Grievous Bodily Harm regardless of whether or not the activity was consensual as it would 
not constitute ‘reasonable surgical interference’.  Under current UK statutory law an indixiii -
vidual cannot give valid consent to another to perform surgery on them unless that other per-
son is a licensed medical professional.  By granting physicians (and not all moral agents) xiv
this power to insulate themselves from criminal charges when consent has been sought, the 
state erects barriers to entry around the entitlement to use certain technologies (surgical tech-
niques and prescription only medications for example). Physicians, hence, benefit from a 
state backed monopoly over licences to practice which enables their professional societies to 
exercise control over who can use medical technology without facing charges of Wounding, 
Actual Bodily Harm and Grievous Bodily Harm.  xv
As licences to practice are granted through professional societies on the condition that 
those who acquire them practice medicine according to certain standards, monopolistic con-
trol over who can get a licence means that professional societies effectively determine how 
the technology is used.  An example of this control are the limitations set on Cochlea imxvi -
plants. Cochlea implants are electronic medical devices that replace the function of the dam-
aged inner ear. Unlike hearing aids (which make sounds louder), Cochlea implants bypass the 
damaged parts of the ear and transmit sound signals directly to the brain. By bypassing the 
normal hearing process, cochlea implants can theoretically enable individuals to hear sounds 
that people with organic hearing devices would not be able to, such as ultrasound. In virtue of 
physicians as a group having a monopoly over the terms of access to medical technology, 
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however, cochlea implants can only be adjusted to pre-determined settings by medical ex-
perts.   xvii
IV. Respect for Persons and Non-Interference  
A basic tenet of liberal political philosophy is that respect is the appropriate response 
to persons. To be called to respect something is to be called to take account of that thing in 
one’s deliberations,  to be called to constrain our behaviour towards it in some appropriate xviii
way.  As respect is a response to the value of a thing, the way in which we respect somexix -
thing depends on what we are being called to respect.   xx
One characteristic of persons that is often considered worthy of respect is their ability 
to value things and choose in light of their values as a means to furthering their projects. An 
important way in which we demonstrate our respect for this capacity is by constraining our 
behaviour towards them by granting them a sphere of non-interference  in which they can xxi
live their life in accordance with their own values.  Constraining the behaviour of others by xxii
granting individuals spheres of non-interference allows us to ensure that their ability to pur-
sue complex plans is not thwarted by the unwanted actions of others. Thwarting other peo-
ple’s plans by interfering is to treat them as unimportant, it is a failure to perceive the value 
inherent in people pursuing the projects that matter to them  and, in virtue of this, a failure xxiii
to respect them at people.  
Importantly this is true even if we disapprove of the actions of a person. Respect for 
persons is a form of recognition respect and, hence, is owed regardless of whether we have 
pro-attitudes towards the choices the person we are called upon to respect makes. This means 
respect for persons is not a form of appraisal respect, which is a response to excellence.  xxiv
We neither can, nor should, have appraisal respect for the bad, foolish or sub-optimal. We 
must, however, have recognition respect for them as people regardless of whether we deem 
their pursuits to be excellent. Although respect for persons does not require we value what 
other people value, it does require that ‘we let that person go his own way, whether we ap-
prove of it or not’.   xxv
Some authors argue that respect requires more than this. Robert Noggle, for example, 
argues that respect for person’s gives us at least prima facie reason to promote a person’s 
aims.  Sarah Buss conceives of respect for persons as being intimately connected to the xxvi
sublime and takes it to involve recognition that our perspective on reality is necessarily par-
!7
tial.  Ian Carter argues that respect has an attitudinal component as well as a behavioural xxvii
component which requires we treat other people as ‘opaque’.  This, however, needn't conxxviii -
cern us here, as whatever respect requires above and beyond granting people the space to live 
their own lives free from interference is for the purposes of the argument of this paper imma-
terial. The argument against the medical monopoly does not depend on demonstrating that its 
existence does not actively further people’s projects or that it gives expression to non-respect-
ful attitudes. It is conditional on respect involving non-interference, which is something vir-
tually all conceptions of respect agree upon.  xxix
In conclusion, one of the reasons people are entitled to respect is in virtue of possess-
ing the capacity to value things and choose in light of their values. In order to exercise these 
capacities and pursue projects over time, individuals need to be free to act. It is for this reason 
that, whatever else respect requires, it requires non-interference with their choices. What re-
mains to be shown is how the existence of the medical monopoly, when coupled with physi-
cian refusal to participate in BMPs, is incompatible with respect for people and their capacity 
to pursue projects. This is the task of the next section.  
V. The Medical Monopoly and Non-Interference 
The existence of the medical monopoly is incompatible with respect for persons as 
current legal arrangements do not take adequate account of competent people’s power of con-
sent. Individuals who wish to engage in BMPs must, under current UK legal arrangements, 
find a practitioner who is not a physician to help. These practitioners, let us call them Body 
Modification Specialists (BMSs), are not entitled to perform surgery on people in light of 
them not being licensed medical practitioners. Not being covered by the defence of consent to 
charges of Wounding, Actual Bodily Harm or Grievous Bodily Harm, Body Modification 
Specialists (BMSs) work in a legal grey zone where they are vulnerable to prosecution re-
gardless of whether or not the person undergoing the procedure consented. Not giving norma-
tive weight to an instance of morally transformative consent is incompatible with respect for 
persons as it is through the power of consent that we alter the normative landscape. 
In consenting, we absolve particular others of some of the obligations our rights im-
pose upon them; making an action which was impermissible, permissible. This is crucial if 
people are to live their lives in accordance with their own values as many (if not all) of our 
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plans and projects involve other individuals. The medical monopoly limits the group of peo-
ple who can enter into morally valid transactions to perform BMPs to physicians. This is es-
pecially problematic in light of the fact that those who are entitled to use medical technology 
without fear of prosecution are entitled to do so only on the condition that they do not act 
against the goals of medicine as defined by their professional societies. As professional soci-
eties have a monopolistic entitlement to issue licences to use medical technology, individuals 
who’s BMPs fall outside the realm of procedures professional societies allow their members 
to provide will be effectively precluded from pursuing their projects.  
As the medical profession has a monopoly over the legal terms of access to medical 
technology, it is difficult for individuals to engage in BMPs which fall outside the realm of 
medicine. The medical monopoly does this by limiting the group of people who are entitled 
to use medical technology without fear of prosecution through government backed licensing 
arrangements. The upshot of this is that those who wish to engage in BMPs cannot do so 
without being vulnerable to interference by others. Without the protected sphere of action re-
spect requires we grant people, those who wish to engage of BMPs risk having their plans 
frustrated.  
The medical monopoly grants the medical profession the power to enforce obligations 
which arise from their (voluntarily accepted) professional codes on people who may not sub-
scribe to them. Although respect for persons requires allowing people to form voluntary asso-
ciations  which  make membership  conditional  on  following codes  of  practice,  it  councils 
against allowing these groups to govern the actions of non-members. Although physicians as 
a group are entitled to collectively determine the goals they adhere to, and even if the prac-
tice of medicine is inherently teleological (aiming toward health), the telos of a practice can-
not transfer to the technology itself. 
Limiting the use of medical technology to physicians for the purposes of health is an 
expression of a particular ordering of values which gives health a special weight among the 
projects that could be pursued through the use of medical technology. While it makes sense to 
conceive of a practice being teleological, accepting the idea an object or a piece of technolo-
gy used in that practice has an inherent goal requires buying into controversial metaphysical 
assumptions that individuals in liberal societies cannot be forced to live by. Technology often 
has multiple uses and the fact that one of those uses is medical in no way shows that that use 
ought to be prioritised. Superglue (2-Octyl cyanoacrylate) is used for a variety of purposes. 
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One of the uses of superglue is as a way of quickly sealing wounds, yet no one believes that 
using superglue for other purposes (e.x. model aircraft construction) is problematic. The same 
goes for the internet. Precursors to the internet such as ARPANET were first developed by the 
military for research use. The World Wide Web was created at CERN in Switzerland by Tim 
Berner’s-Lee. Still, the internet has no telos; it is not for anything aside from what we use it 
for.  
 Decreeing that a particular piece of technology is to be used for one end and not an-
other is beyond the scope of any profession in a liberal society even if determining their own 
goals as a collective association of people is. Whilst the profession is entitled to refuse to use 
particular forms of technology or skill for particular ends, professional societies shouldn’t be 
granted exclusive rights to dictate what constitutes appropriate use of particular forms of 
technology. Respect for persons requires that it be within the individual’s purview to decide 
what to value, how much to value it and, so long as they do not cause harm to others, to pur-
sue their ends with the appropriate means. As much of the technology used by physicians can 
be put to other ends (such as beauty or self-expression), granting them monopolistic entitle-
ments to use it precludes people from pursuing things they value by depriving them of the 
means they need to achieve their goals; which is incompatible with respecting them.  
It could be objected at this point that the existence of the medical monopoly does not 
preclude people from modifying their own bodies (which respect requires we allow them to 
do), it merely precludes other people from helping them modify their bodies. This form of 
interference with our plans, called indirect paternalism, may not be as problematic as stop-
ping a person from using their own means to pursue their own goals. This, Thomas 
Schramme argues, is true when an individual does not possess a right to another person’s as-
sistance or when the individual offering the service doesn’t have a strong entitlement to do so 
(such as when the service is inherently harmful or morally dubious).  xxx
Although there may be a difference between direct and indirect paternalism in some 
circumstances, in the case of BMPs the distinction breaks down. Even if it is true that people 
don’t have a right to another person’s assistance in the pursuit of BMPs, they do have the 
right to access the means through which to do so. The existence of the medical monopoly 
does not merely preclude individuals from offering and accepting assistance, it also precludes 
them from accessing the means to pursue their projects by themselves. The medical mo-
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nopoly as it currently stands, hence, cannot be defended on merely indirect paternalistic 
grounds.   xxxi
Finally, it is also not clear that offering to assist people in the pursuit of BMPs is an 
inherently morally dubious or harmful service. Unless one takes the view that a person’s 
health is the only legitimate reason for altering one’s body (i.e. the view that the medical mo-
nopoly promotes), it is far from clear that the pursuit of BMPs is inherently harmful. Many 
people achieve things they value through the pursuit of BMPs and willingly take health risks 
to achieve them in much the same way people trade off their health for success or gratifica-
tion in others realms of life. The fact that engaging in BMPs involves the alteration of the in-
dividuals flesh is not in itself a reason to consider the activity harmful. Although it may be 
problematic for physicians to offer to help people undermine their own health in the pursuit 
of other goals, the problem lies in the fact it could be considered a violation of voluntarily 
accepted professional duties. Absent the professional commitment to prioritise health over 
other goals, providing assistance in the pursuit of BMPs seems no more morally dubious than 
a boxing coach assisting a professional boxer to lose water weight before a fight weigh-in 
(which can have adverse health consequences), or a rock climbing instructor assisting some-
one in negotiating a potentially dangerous ascent.  
VI. Abolishing the Medical Monopoly  
Above I argued that it was the combination of physician refusal to participate in the 
pursuit of BMPs and the existence of the medical monopoly that precluded people from liv-
ing their lives in accordance with their own values. In order to enable people to engage in 
BMPs: i) force those who possess licences to provide services or, ii) allow individuals who 
are willing to perform these services to do so. In this section I will argue for the latter option. 
The medical monopoly should be abolished in favour of a liberalised market for medical 
technology which does not fail to respect either those who wish to engage in BMPs, those 
who perform them (BMSs), or the physicians who want nothing to do with BMPs.  
Michael Cholbi argues that the fact that physicians benefit from a medical monopoly 
implies that they do not possess a right to conscientious objection and, hence, can be com-
pelled to provide controversial medical services. Failing to do so, Cholbi argues, allows 
physicians to violate the duties of reciprocity they have incurred in virtue of their privileged 
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position.  What Cholbi considers inconsistent ‘is medicine enjoying a cartel status that xxxii
provides it a monopoly on these technologies while also arrogating to itself the right to deny 
people access to these technologies’.  Cholbi’s argument for forcing physicians to provide xxxiii
controversial services proceeds on the assumption that physicians ought to have a monopoly 
over medical technology.  This is the assumption this paper challenges.  xxxiv
Physicians who object to engaging in BMPs have as much (and no more) of a right to 
live their own lives in accordance with their own values as all other individuals. Respect for 
persons requires we do not force them to provide their skills in the pursuit of goals they con-
sider to be either wrong or counter to the way in which they view the goals of their profes-
sion. When physicians freely associate to constitute professional societies and collectively 
determine their professional obligations, respect for individual physicians generates an oblig-
ation to respect their collective determinations of their obligations. Forcing physicians (either 
individually or as a collective) to forgo their values and act against their professional obliga-
tions is a big price to pay for others being entitled to access medical technology. Moreover, it 
is an unnecessary price to pay. If, instead of forcing physicians to perform BMPs, we allow 
Body Modification Specialists (BMSs) to use the technology necessary to do so, we can en-
sure that people who wish to engage in BMPs (and access other controversial services) can 
do so without forcing any of the parties to act against their values. Abolishing the medical 
monopoly, hence, allows us to respect BMSs, physicians who wish to refuse to participate 
and the individuals who want to pursue BMPs. If the medical profession ceases to have mo-
nopolistic entitlements to use technology, physicians needn’t be forced to provide the services 
they object to. In the absence of a medical monopoly, physicians do not fail to fulfil duties of 
reciprocity by not providing their services. In a liberalised market for medical technology, 
physicians are free to refuse to participate because individuals who do not subscribe to the 
internal morality of medicine can access medical technology and use it to provide BMPs.  
So, what would a liberalised market for medical technology look like? In the remain-
der of this section I will make a positive case for the abolition of the medical monopoly by 
looking at two examples of technology that non-medical practitioners are not currently enti-
tled to use: local injectable anaesthetics and surgical skill. 
Body Modification Specialists are not currently trained in evidence based surgical 
techniques. BMSs, like tattoo artists, undertake unregulated apprenticeships under more ex-
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perienced practitioners.  The lack of accredited training makes it hard for people to choose xxxv
the practitioners they wish to visit and to ensure they receive safe body modifications. The 
lack of training is problematic for practitioners (and the industry as a whole) as there is little 
opportunity for robust standards of good practice to emerge. The lack of surgical training for 
Body Modification Specialists (BMSs) means those who wish to engage in BMPs have to 
make do with lower standards of competence than, say, those who wish to have conventional 
surgery (who can be helped by trained surgeons).  
Body Modification Specialists (BMSs) are currently not allowed to use local in-
jectable anaesthetics. This is due to the fact local anaesthetics are ‘prescription only medi-
cines (POMs) therefore they can only be prescribed by a suitably qualified practitioner’.  xxxvi
Suitably qualified practitioner, in the context of this quote, does not include piercers, tat-
tooists or BMSs. Local anaesthetic injections, hence, ‘are not licensed for local anaesthesia 
prior to tattoo or body piercing’ . Neither are they licensed for BMPs such as scarificaxxxvii -
tion, branding or the insertion of implants as these procedures are not carried out by medics. 
In practice, the prohibition on the use of local injectable anaesthetics in body modification 
means that people have to suffer pains not associated with conventional surgery since Dr 
William T G Morton and Dr John Collins Warren performed the first successful operation 
using anaesthesia in 1846.   xxxviii
 In a liberalised market for medical technology, Body Modification Specialists (BMSs) 
would have access to both surgical training and injectable local anaesthetics (among other 
pieces of technology). Allowing BMSs to use this technology without fear of prosecution 
would enable individuals who wish to engage in BMPs to have them performed with the tools 
necessary to do so.  
 Having provided a sketch of what a liberalised market for BMPs could look like, and 
shown it to be compatible with respect for persons, it is time to turn to look at reasons why 
we should not abolish the medical monopoly. This is important because respect for persons 
isn’t the only value at stake in the discussion over who should have access to medical tech-
nology. In the next section I will address objections based on the idea that liberalising access 
to medical technology raises safety concerns. Section VIII addresses objections to abolishing 
the medical monopoly based on the idea that we have a duty to uphold our health.  
!13
VII. Safety First  
 One reason we could have to object to liberalising access to medical technology is 
that doing so is inherently dangerous. The reason it is permissible to limit access to medical 
technology to physicians is that they, and only they, possess the knowledge to use medical 
technology safely.  
 That the medical technology we use in the 21st century has the potential to cause se-
vere harms to the people it is used upon is undeniable. What is not clear is that concerns 
about ensuring the safety of individuals participating in BMPs justify the current legal prohi-
bition on non-physicians using medical technology. Prohibitionist approaches rarely make 
activities safer. It is difficult for robust standards of good practice to emerge when people 
cannot do their business in the light of day. If we want to stop those who pursue BMPs from 
coming to harm, allowing BMSs to access training and medical technology legally is a step 
toward greater competence and higher safety standards.  
 One question this solution raises concerns how much training BMSs would need to 
undergo to perform their procedures safely. In the extreme, it may be that individuals need all 
the skills of a general surgeon to perform BMPs safely. Although we may have reason to en-
sure that BMSs receive adequate training to ensure the safety of those who engage in BMPs 
with their assistance, this is not the same as requiring that BMSs possess medical degrees. 
Although it is true that some of the procedures that BMSs carry out require access to similar 
training and techniques as those required by surgeons, the set of skills and procedures re-
quired are not identical.  
 To see why, consider the case of branding. Branding involves the infliction of 1st or 
2nd degree burns to the skin in order to get the skin to generate scar tissue.  Judging how xxxix
long to expose the skin to heat requires anatomical knowledge of how skin reacts to trauma. 
The success of a brand depends on the skin being burnt enough to scar visibly whilst ensuring 
that the person undergoing the procedure doesn’t end up with 3rd degree burns. Achieving a 
good and safe brand requires damaging the skin just enough, delaying the healing process by 
adding irritants to the wound, whilst still ensuring it eventually heals without becoming infec-
ted. The ability to monitor the healing process to ensure the right aesthetic results are 
achieved in a safe way requires a good knowledge of the healing process of burns which is 
distinct from the knowledge physicians possess. As the aim of the physician is to ensure 
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burns and wounds heal as quickly as possible with minimal scarring, they lack knowledge on 
how to aggravate wounds in a controlled manner. 
 Although performing BMPs may require detailed knowledge about certain bodily 
processes and a set of skills surgeons don’t necessarily cultivate, for the most part it will re-
quire much less knowledge and skill than performing complex surgical procedures (such as 
those that require entering the abdominal cavity or the use of general anaesthetics). In light to 
this, solving safety concerns through training is not merely a recreation of the medical mo-
nopoly.  
 Safety concerns can also be mitigated in a legalised market by enabling BMSs to rely 
on the assistance of qualified medical professionals if the individual undergoing the proce-
dure suffers an adverse reaction. Making it easier for BMSs to direct people to more qualified 
professionals can reduce the extent to which BMSs have to be trained. As occurs in conven-
tional medical settings, people are transferred from one practitioner or specialist to others de-
pending on the nature of the problem and the skill set required. What is crucial in maintaining 
the safety of these arrangements is people being able to identify when more help is needed 
and transferring patients on. Ensuring people know when to transfer patients to other practi-
tioners (such as emergency room doctors) is not as demanding as knowing how to resolve the 
complications (which may require the knowledge commensurate with a medical degree). 
Many studios that perform BMPs on people already provide advice on how to monitor com-
plications and on when to send patients to the emergency room or their family physician. 
 One objection to this solution is that liberalising access to medical technology may 
lead to individuals requiring extra medical assistance from the health service than would oth-
erwise be the case. In countries with socialised healthcare, liberalising access to medical 
technology requires diverting healthcare resources into dealing with the consequences of 
BMPs and away from other more important areas of care. If this is so, the objection proceeds, 
we have reason to limit access to medical technology to ensure a just distribution of medical 
services. In as far as respecting people does not require tolerating people violating their duties 
towards either society in general or to particular others, limiting access to medical technology 
to ensure a just distribution of resources may be compatible with the demand that people are 
entitled to respect. 
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 The use of scarce medical resources is indeed problematic; especially when doing so 
deprives other (potentially more worthy) candidates of appropriate care. It is not, however, a 
reason to limit access to medical technology to physicians. This isn’t, after all, how we deal 
with people pursuing all sorts of other dangerous activities such as skiing or rock climbing. If 
the problem with extending access to bio-medical technology to BMSs is the potential in-
creased burden on nationalised systems such as the NHS, people who wish to engage in 
BMPs could be forced to purchase private insurance or offset the costs incurred by the NHS 
in some other way. Limiting access to bio-medical technology, thereby precluding people 
from pursuing their projects, isn’t necessary to achieve the goal of preserving fairness in the 
allocation of scarce medical resources. Individuals, hence, should be free to pursue BMPs 
with the use of medical technology so long as they offset the costs incurred by socialised sys-
tems such as the NHS.  
VIII. A Duty to Uphold our Health? 
 If potential distributive concerns cannot ground a prohibition on accessing medical 
technology when doing so has potentially adverse health consequences, another possibility 
could be that all individuals have a self-regarding duty to uphold their own health.  Limiting xl
access to medical technology to physicians could be seen as a way of ensuring that we all sat-
isfy our duty to maintain our health. As respect for persons does not require we abstain from 
interfering with them when they violate their duties, precluding people from accessing med-
ical technology would be compatible with respect for persons. 
 The idea that people possess self-regarding duties to maintain their own health has 
initial intuitive appeal and appears to be relatively widespread in as far as people who act in 
ways incompatible with their health are often scorned, reprimanded and/or encouraged to do 
otherwise. Following Kant, we may think we have a duty to uphold our health in virtue of the 
fact that minimum health is a precondition for exercising our moral personhood.  If this is xli
the basis for our obligation to uphold our own health, however, our duty to maintain our 
health only kicks in at the bottom end of the spectrum of health. This is due to the fact that 
moral personhood and successful agency in the world are compatible with high levels of 
morbidity. Denying this is tantamount to denying that the ill and/or disabled are capable of 
moral personhood which, except in the most extreme circumstances, is not true. If moral per-
sonhood is the basis of our duty to maintain our health, most (if not all) BMPs would be 
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compatible with fulfilling this duty. This duty to preserve our health, hence, cannot ground 
the conclusion that access to medical technology ought to be restricted.  
 If, on the other hand, we take our obligations to maintain our health to have a more 
perfectionistic character, little is left of our freedom to live our own lives. This argument 
threatens to prove too much. Not only would people not be entitled to use medical technology 
to pursue other goals, individuals would also have to be precluded from engaging in a whole 
range of other activities (such as mountaineering, working with dangerous substances, being 
a professional athlete or refusing medical treatment) for the sake of their health. Although a 
life devoted to the maintenance of health to the detriment of other goals may be the end of 
life for some, most of us achieve valuable ends by risking our health. Ultimately lots of peo-
ple want to be healthy to live, not live to be healthy.  
  
IX. Best interests  
 It could be objected that the case against the medical monopoly has been overstated. 
If, instead of understanding their duties as being strictly centred around health promotion and 
maintenance, physicians used a ‘best interest’ standard to determine whether an individual 
should be entitled to engage in BMPs, the fact that physician’s have a monopoly over the use 
of medical technology would be less problematic. If physicians took into account the cultural 
and idiosyncratic values of the person who they are intending to help when making decisions 
about whether to provide their services, people would not be precluded from pursuing non-
health based BMPs. 
 Some medical associations such as the General Medical Council or the British Medic-
al Association take cultural considerations into account when determining whether or not to 
assist an individual in the pursuit of non-health based BMPs. This line of reasoning can and 
has been applied to allow people to circumcise their children for cultural reasons and as a 
grounds for arguing that physicians ought to be allowed to help people to die on their own 
terms. Adopting a ‘best interest’ standard can also serve to justify cosmetic surgeons provid-
ing aesthetic services to their clients as it allows them to take into account the non-medical 
reasons for pursuing cosmetic enhancement such as the potential for increased sexual attract-
iveness or earning potential .  xlii
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 This move, however, should be resisted. Having physician’s use a ‘best interest’ 
standard inevitably involves a generalisation of expertise.  Although physicians may have a xliii
wealth of knowledge about the biochemical processes that constitute us and even what it 
means to be healthy, they are not experts on how to integrate cultural and idiosyncratic con-
cerns into one's life or how to weigh any of one’s personal values against that of health. All of 
these are value questions, not pure matters of fact. In a liberal society both what to value and 
how much to value it are not questions doctors are entitled to decide for others (absent the 
person’s consent to delegate these concerns to their physician). Although it is laudable that 
some physicians are realising that people’s idiosyncratic and cultural concerns merit consid-
eration, they err if they consider themselves to have a special role in helping people balance 
these concerns against the other things they value. 
 The main problem with physicians using a ‘best interest’ standard is that it doesn’t 
challenge the fundamental problem of the medical monopoly: physicians having undue power 
over our lives. There is no guarantee that, in moving to a ‘best interest’ standard disagree-
ments between physicians and people who wish to use medical technology to further goals 
other than health will disappear. When a disagreement arises, we face a choice between two 
options. The first option is to defer to the person’s own interpretation of their best interests 
and force physicians to provide the services the person requests, even if the physician con-
siders these to be counter to the person’s ‘best interests’. Say an individual with an easily for-
gettable face visits their local cosmetic surgeon to have their tongue split, their nostrils re-
shaped into slits and their ears reduced in size with the express goal of looking more like a 
lizard.  Imagine the individual thinks this is in their best interests because it makes them look 
very striking, unique and memorable; three qualities they currently lack. If adopting a ‘best 
interest’ standard involves deferring to the patient’s interpretation of their best interests, the 
cosmetic surgeon can be forced to provide their services. This option is unacceptable in as far 
as it involves failing to respect physicians’ right to abstain from providing services they may 
object to.   xliv
 The second option is no better. If we allow physicians to refuse to participate in BMPs 
when they consider these to go against the person’s ‘best interests’, there is a risk that indi-
viduals who wish to take on highly unconventional aesthetic projects (such as looking more 
like a lizard), will be deprived of the means they need to pursue their projects.  The problem xlv
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caused by the medical monopoly will resurface regardless of what standard physicians use to 
determine whether or not treatment is appropriate. The objection to the medical monopoly 
isn’t that physicians use the wrong principle to determine whether or not a particular inter-
vention falls within the bounds of their profession. The problem with the medical monopoly 
lies in the fact it grants physicians the exclusive entitlement to use medical technology leg-
ally. So long as the medical profession has monopolistic legal entitlements to use medical 
technology and rules out some interventions as beyond the scope of their profession, some 
individuals will be precluded from living their own lives in accordance with their own values. 
This means it cannot be solved by modifying the criteria used by those who possess mono-
polistic legal entitlements; it can only be solved by abolishing the medical monopoly so that 
individuals other than physicians can access medical technology. 
X. Conclusion  
 Physicians currently determine the terms of access to medical technology by control-
ling who is entitled to use the technology legally and, by doing so, how medical technology is 
to be used. Physicians having a monopoly over the terms of access to medical technology is 
problematic as it precludes people who wish to engage in BMPs from accessing the technol-
ogy they need to do so. Drawing on an account of respect as non-interference, I have argued 
that we ought to abolish the medical monopoly in order to respect individuals who wish to 
pursue BMPs as persons. Allowing physicians to have control over the terms of access to 
medical technology is incompatible with respect for persons as, without access to medical 
technology and the entitlement to use it legally, individuals who wish to engage in BMPs are 
vulnerable to interference by others and, as a consequence, risk having their plans frustrated.  
Health needn’t be the only goal medical technology is used to further. Although phys-
icians have professional obligations to maintain and promote the health of the individuals 
they care for, these professional obligations do not ground a right to preclude others from us-
ing technology to promote their own idiosyncratic and cultural goals (even at the expense of 
their health). In a liberal society no profession ought to have such far reaching powers to de-
termine the pursuits people are entitled to engage in.  
So long as physicians retain monopolistic control over the use of medical technology, 
their refusals to participate in certain practices lead to individual’s having their life plans 
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thwarted. This has led some authors to argue that physicians’ right to conscientious objection 
should be curtailed to ensure access to technology. This solution to the problem comes at a 
cost, for it is incompatible with respecting physicians as persons and with upholding their 
right to use voluntary associations such as the General Medical Council or the American 
Medical Association to collectively determine the boundaries of the profession. Moreover, it 
is an unnecessary cost to pay as abolishing the medical monopoly allows us to respect both 
the people who wish to engage in BMPs and the physicians who do not.  
Divesting physicians of their monopolistic control over medical technology is the 
only way of ensuring that access to the means necessary to pursue BMPs is not conditional 
on physicians approving of one’s pursuits; for anything short of abolishing the medical 
monopoly still grants physicians powers to influence the course of peoples lives they 
shouldn’t have.  xlvi
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